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ABSTRACT: This paper brings to light the significance of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking for 
contemporary physics. The point of departure is his 1956–57 Collège de France lectures on 
Nature, coupled with his reflections on the crisis in modern physics appearing in The Visible and 
the Invisible. Developments in theoretical physics after his death are then explored and a 
deepening of the crisis is disclosed. The upshot is that physics’ intractable problems of 
uncertainty and subject-object interaction can only be addressed by shifting its philosophical 
base from objectivism to phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty suggested. Merleau-Ponty’s 
allusion to “topological space” in The Visible and the Invisible provides a clue for bridging the gap 
between “hard science” and “soft philosophy.” This lead is pursued in the present paper by 
employing the paradoxical topology of the Klein bottle. The hope is that, by “softening” 
physics and “hardening” phenomenology, the “two cultures” (cf. C. P. Snow) can be wed and a 
new kind of science be born. 




Although Merleau-Ponty did not write extensively about the discipline of physics over 
the course of his career, he made it clear that the subject held much significance for 
him. “Why not admit,” he said to Bergson in a mild rebuke of Bergson’s occasionally 
anti-scientific stance, “that physics, as objective as it is, can be highly meaningful for 
philosophy?” (1956–60/2003, 110). Merleau-Ponty was also convinced of the converse: 
that physics can benefit from philosophy, and in particular, from the 
phenomenological approach. This is because contemporary physics, in 
unquestioningly adhering to the classical ontology, is hard put to deal with the 
nonlinearities and paradoxes of the phenomena it encounters. In Merleau-Ponty’s 
words, “The physicist frames with an objectivist ontology a physics that is no longer 
objectivist” (1968, 25). Merleau-Ponty well understood how the phenomena of modern 
physics uniquely defy the dualisms, objectifications, and idealizations of Cartesian 
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thought, and how this necessitates a reorientation of physics’ philosophical 
foundations. He knew, for example, that, to deal meaningfully with the microphysical 
inseparability of observer and observed, the observer or subject must be recognized as 
being situated in the world, not seen as a deus ex machina that flies above it. But Merleau-
Ponty never crystallized in detail his vision of a phenomenological physics. A gap was 
thus left between the “soft” intimations of phenomenology and the “hard” facts of 
physics. Might it be possible to “soften” physics and “harden” phenomenology in a 
manner that would bridge the gap between these seemingly irreconcilable endeavors, 
these “two cultures”? The present paper is devoted to exploring such a possibility. 
 
To my knowledge, Merleau-Ponty’s most explicit treatment of modern physics appears 
in La Nature (1956–60/2003), the course notes from his Collège de France lectures on 
the concept of Nature. The material in question is found in Part 2 of the First Course 
(1956–57), titled “Modern Science and Nature.”1 After introducing the subject by 
bringing out the contribution modern science can make to the ontological clarification 
of nature, Merleau-Ponty proceeds to focus on quantum mechanics. Using Laplacean 
ontology as his foil, he summarizes interpretively such quantum mechanical themes as 
complementarity, nonclassical logic, and the inherently probabilistic nature of 
microphysics. Then he broadens his scope to explore the philosophical significance of 
quantum mechanics. In raising the question of what would constitute a philosophy 
adequate to the phenomena of the microworld, Merleau-Ponty rejects both 
nominalism and idealism. “If a philosophy can correspond to quantum mechanics, it 
will be both a more realistic philosophy, of which the truth will not be defined in 
transcendental terms, and more subjectivist. The situated and incarnated aspect of the 
physicist must succeed the universal ‘I think’ of transcendental philosophy” (97). 
The incarnated subject is of course a perceiving subject. “The problem posed by 
physics,” notes Merleau-Ponty, “approaches the problem posed by perception” (97). 
The upshot is that physics and philosophy alike must learn to start their work not from 
the lofty abstractions of Cartesianism, but from the lived experiences of subjects who 
share a common world. Perception has primacy in such a lifeworld. But isn’t ordinary 
perception repelled by the ambiguities of modern physics? Merleau-Ponty notes that 
despite this widespread belief, in actuality ordinary perception is itself filled with 
quantum-like ambiguities—provided that it is not idealized in the Cartesian way (99). 
Though the conventional idea of “common sense” may eschew such apparent 
anomalies, to the common sense or shared sensibility of the intersubjective world, they 
1 A word of caution: In the translator’s introduction to this work, Robert Vallier acknowledges that the 
text does not derive from the pen of Merleau-Ponty himself but from his spoken lectures, which were 
distilled by a diligent student in the form of typewritten notes. Nevertheless, the editors obviously found 
this material credible enough and valuable enough to publish it. 
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are neither unfamiliar, nor are they denied. Merleau-Ponty concludes that “physics 
destroys certain prejudices of philosophical and non-philosophical thought….The 
internal critique of physics leads us to become aware of the perceived world” (100). 
In subsequent lectures of the First Course, Merleau-Ponty takes up the questions of 
space and time, and Whitehead’s approach to these issues. For present purposes, I will 
limit myself to considering only the portion of this material with the greatest relevance 
for physics. Here Merleau-Ponty turns to the theory of relativity and Einstein’s notion 
of the relativity of simultaneity. He agrees with Einstein that there is no absolute 
simultaneity in the classical sense of all events being timed by a single clock ticking 
objectively across the universe. But Merleau-Ponty takes exception to the Einsteinian 
implication that each local observer possesses his or her own unique time concretely 
disjoined from all others, coordinated with them only through the mathematical 
abstractions of the space-time continuum. Merleau-Ponty says: 
My duration is not a purely interior one. Certainly universal time is not the same 
as mine (there is not objective simultaneity), but it cannot be absolutely other, 
either. Something responds to my duration….The proper given of philosophy is 
not interior time, but the time in which we are placed, in which we live, not the 
signification time and space of science, but actual time and space….The Absolute 
[time and space] that the philosopher returns to is that of the incarnated and 
situated subject…. If the physicist [hopes] to retrieve a world behind equations, it 
is because there is a participation in this intersubjectivity. This philosophical 
simultaneity emerges from our belonging to the world as the world from which 
we arise. (111–12) 
La Nature is not the only forum in which Merleau-Ponty reflects on contemporary 
physics. In a later discussion appearing in The Visible and the Invisible, he says that, while 
the phenomena of modern physics cry out for a new, nonclassical, non-objectifying 
ontology, they are “retranslated [by physicists] into the language of the traditional 
ontology” (1968, 16). Merleau-Ponty devotes much attention here to questioning the 
objectifying tendencies in both modern physics and psychology, tendencies that 
presuppose the subject-object split: 
The cleavage between the ‘subjective’ and the ‘objective’ according to which 
physics defines its domain…and correlatively psychology also establishes its 
domain, does not prevent [the subjective and objective] from being conceived 
according to the same fundamental structure; on the contrary it requires that: 
they are finally two orders of objects, to be known in their intrinsic properties by 
a pure thought which determines what they are in themselves. But…a moment 
comes when the very development of knowledge calls into question the absolute 
spectator always presupposed. (1968, 19–20) 
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Over half a century has passed since Merleau-Ponty’s death and—because physics 
has still not responded effectively to the critique of the “absolute spectator” implicit in 
its own phenomena, its crisis has continued. In fact, it has gotten worse. This is 
brought out by the physicist Lee Smolin in his controversial book, The Trouble With 
Physics (2006). In my own work (Rosen 2004, 2008a, 2008b), I have attempted to get to 
the nub of the predicament. 
According to modern physics, nature is governed by four fundamental forces: 
electromagnetism, gravitation, and the strong and weak nuclear forces. These forces 
appear to operate in very different ways and theorists have long been concerned with 
the question of how they could be described in a unified manner. The unification 
project is wedded to cosmogony. We are told that, even though the forces of nature 
assume distinct forms in the present-day universe, around the time of the big bang 
they constituted a single, amalgamated force. Then, as the universe cooled and 
expanded, this primordial symmetry was spontaneously broken and the forces took on 
their present appearance of being irreconcilably different. The aim of theoretical 
physics is to recover the original symmetry through mathematical analysis. And the 
underlying problem is that the early universe existing before expansion and cooling 
was a microphysically compressed, hyper-energetic, roiling chaos that flies in the face 
of Cartesian order. With each mathematical step backward toward the big bang taken 
in the name of unification, the chaos that must be accommodated increases and the 
analysis becomes more strained. The physicists Steven Weinberg and Abdus Salam 
did appear to successfully unify the electromagnetic and weak nuclear forces in 1968. 
Electroweak unification was cast within the framework of quantum mechanics, where 
the uncertainty associated with microworld turbulence was well managed by the 
probabilistic equations. In attempting to accomplish a unification that included the 
strong nuclear force, physicists of the 1970s faced higher energies and greater levels of 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the so-called grand unification of the three quantum 
mechanical forces could still be considered at least a partial success, enough so that 
attention could be turned to the ultimate goal of incorporating the gravitational force. 
And that is where progress ground to a halt. The equations that would unify all four 
forces of nature were now completely unable to contain the even more wildly 
fluctuating energies, as manifested by infinite probability values that turned up to 
render those equations useless. Consequently, there has not been much meaningful 
movement toward an effective theory of quantum gravity over the past 35 years. 
Musing ironically over this, Smolin (2006) observes that, “for more than two 
centuries…our understanding of the laws of nature expanded rapidly…. [yet] today, 
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despite our best efforts, what we know for certain about these laws is no more than 
what we knew back in the 1970s” (viii). 
What “best efforts” is Smolin referring to? Since the 1970s, the quest for a 
mathematical unification of nature has largely been dominated by an approach known 
as string theory. Quantum mechanical uncertainty is correlated with scale of magnitude: 
the smaller the scale, the greater the uncertainty.  There is actually a specific threshold 
called the Planck length (10–35 meter) below which the chaos becomes totally 
unmanageable. What string theory does is avoid probing below this scale simply by 
assuming that the smallest constituents of nature are not indefinitely miniscule point-
particles as previous theory had assumed, but string-like vibrating elements of finite 
extension conveniently scaled at the Planck length. It is because this stratagem has 
successfully managed to eliminate infinite terms from quantum gravitational equations 
that it has become the preferred approach. But the price paid for this positivistic ploy 
is now being acknowledged more openly (Smolin 2006, Woit 2006). In my own 
exploration of the matter (Rosen 2004, 2008a, 2008b), I have identified several 
problems with string theory. 
First, while it is true that string theory serves the classical ontology by sidestepping 
sub-Planckian ambiguity, an epistemic ambiguity takes its place. String theory’s general 
equations may be free of unmanageable infinities, but theorists must be able to solve 
these highly abstract equations in a manner that produces a specific description of the 
world as we know it. As things now stand, the equations yield a vast array of possible 
solutions with no guiding principle by means of which the field can be narrowed in 
unique correspondence with known physical reality. A second limitation of the theory 
is the evident impossibility of objectively testing it in a direct fashion since, according 
to physicist Brian Greene, the test would have to be conducted on a scale “some 
hundred million billion times smaller than anything we can directly probe 
experimentally [!]” (1999, 212). Finally, the theory seems to contradict itself in its 
assumption of fundamental particles with finite extension. “Strings are truly 
fundamental” says Greene, “they are ‘atoms,’ uncuttable constituents” of nature. So, 
“even though strings have spatial extent, the question of their composition is without 
any content” (141). But isn’t this a contradiction? For—at least according to the 
classical concept of the continuum not explicitly challenged by string theory, to be 
spatially extended is to be cuttable, in fact, infinitely divisible. How then could a string 
be a fundamental particle, an atomic or indivisible ingredient of nature, when it is 
spatially extended? In sum, string theory is ambiguous, objectively untestable, and it 
contradicts itself when seen in classical terms. At bottom the message seems to be 
that—in seeking a “theory of everything” that would unify all of nature within the 
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classical ontology—physics has reached the point where it is unable to deny the 
repudiation of classical ontology. I noted earlier Merleau-Ponty’s observation in the 
1950s that the “physicist frames with an objectivist ontology a physics that is no longer 
objectivist” (1968, 25). What we are witnessing since the confrontation with quantum 
gravity began in the 1970s is the physicist’s utter inability to effectively employ 
objectivist ontology. Now s/he has no choice but to find a nonobjectivist approach 
capable of doing justice to the phenomena—to the inherently ambiguous things 
themselves. 
The general effect of classical ontology on perception has indeed been profound, 
and it is no less evident among physicists. Little wonder then that the “sub-Planckian 
chaos” should look so alien to a Cartesian physics still attempting to idealize the world 
from afar. Of course the “chaos” might appear quite different to a physicist who is 
situated in that world. As Merleau-Ponty knew, the phenomena of modern physics do 
evidence such intensive participation in nature. This is specifically seen in the quantum 
mechanical uncertainty relation. The uncertainty that arises in measuring the positions 
and velocities of particles reflects the fact that, in the quantum world, the very act of 
observing significantly influences the states of the beings that are observed. And the 
closer we draw to the Planck length, the greater is this interaction between observer 
and observed. It is as if the quantum phenomena themselves were extending an 
invitation to the physicist to abandon his or her position of aloof “objectivity” and 
enter into the natural order of things. Though ignoring this invitation has not been a 
viable option for physics since the 1970s, ignored it has been, and the consequence has 
been stagnation. 
Given the longstanding, deeply engrained habits of thought that have come to 
govern “common sense,” it is not surprising that physics has thus far been unable to 
reground itself in a nonobjectivist ontology such as that offered by Merleau-Ponty and 
other phenomenological philosophers. But, granting the understandable intransigence 
of this “hard science,” perhaps the problem also lies in the “softness” of 
phenomenology, the non-specificity of its concepts and structures. Two years before 
his death, Merleau-Ponty himself provided a clue for how the gap between “soft” and 
“hard” could be bridged: 
Take topological space as a model of being. The Euclidean space is the model for 
[idealized] perspectival being [and is consistent]...with the classical 
ontology....The topological space, on the contrary, [is] a milieu in which are 
circumscribed relations of proximity, of envelopment, etc. [and] is the image of a 
being that...is at the same time older than everything and ‘of the first day’ 
(Hegel)....[Topological space] is encountered not only at the level of the physical 
world, but again it is constitutive of life, and finally it founds the wild principle of 
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Logos — — It is this wild or brute being that intervenes at all levels to overcome 
the problems of the classical ontology. (1968, 210–11) 
Of course, conventional topology is just as much part of the objectivist enterprise as 
conventional physics. Here topology is defined abstractly as the branch of mathematics 
that concerns itself with the properties of geometric figures that stay the same when the 
figures are stretched or deformed. Merleau-Ponty was clearly not thinking of topology 
in these terms. For a better understanding of his thinking, it may help to consider the 
etymology of the word. Topology is the study of topos, “place.” The concrete character 
of this term is evidenced by its relation to words like “posture”: the root meaning of 
“posture” is “to place.” Philosopher of science John Schumacher thus defines 
“posture” as “the way a thing makes a place in the world” (1989, 17–18)—i.e., the way 
it situates itself (the original name for topology was “analysis situs”). Accordingly, the 
philosopher Maxine Sheets-Johnstone is able to demonstrate that, whereas Euclidean 
geometry, for example, involves practices that are largely disembodied, “topology...is 
rooted in the body” (1990, 42). Then could topology not be useful in an ontological 
regrounding of physics that requires it to descend from its Cartesian heights and 
reenter the natural world in an embodied way? One curious topological structure 
proves especially promising in mediating between theoretical physics and 
phenomenological intuition: the Klein bottle. 
An ordinary bottle conforms to conventional intuition regarding inside and 
outside. It is a container whose interior region is clearly set off from what lies outside of 
it. If we fill such a bottle with liquid, for instance, and seal its cap, the fluid will remain 
enclosed—unless the surface is broken, in which case it will pour out. Although 
conventional containers are thus either open or closed, let us try to imagine a vessel 
that is both. I am not merely referring to a container that is partially closed (such as a 
bottle without its cap), but to a vessel that is completely closed and completely open at 
the same time. The liquid contents of such a strange vessel would be well sealed within it, 
and yet, paradoxically, they would freely spill out! The Klein bottle (Fig. 1) is a 
container of this sort. Its paradoxical structure flagrantly defies the classical intuition of 
containment that compels us to think in either/or terms (closed or open, inside or 
outside, etc.).2 
2 Elsewhere I have shown how the standard analysis of the Klein bottle questionably sidesteps the 
challenge to classical thought, and how conventional mathematics itself must be challenged to bring to 
light the Klein bottle’s full implications for phenomenological philosophy (Rosen 2004, 2006) and 
theoretical physics (Rosen 2004, 2008a, 2008b). Since I cannot go into these matters here, I will take the 
liberty of employing the Klein bottle in a nonstandard, nonobjectivist manner without attempting to 
justify this approach. 
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Figure 1. The Klein bottle 
 
The topological property of the Klein bottle that is responsible for its peculiar 
nature is its one-sidedness. More commonplace topological figures such as the sphere and 
the doughnut-shaped torus are two-sided; their opposing sides can be identified in a 
straightforward, unambiguous fashion. Therefore, they meet the classical expectation 
of being closed structures, structures whose interior regions remain interior. In the 
contrasting case of the Klein bottle, inside and outside are freely reversible. Let me try 
to shed more light on just what this means. 
 
 
Figure 2. Parts of the Klein bottle (after Ryan 1993, 98) 
 
Figure 2 is my adaptation of communication theorist Paul Ryan’s (1993, 98) linear 
schemata for the Klein bottle. According to Ryan, the three basic features of the Klein 
bottle are “part contained,” “part uncontained,” and “part containing.” Here we see 
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how the part contained opens out (at the bottom of the figure) to form the perimeter of 
the container, and how this, in turn, passes over into the uncontained aspect (in the 
upper portion of Fig. 2). The three parts of this structure thus flow into one another in 
a continuous, self-containing movement that flies in the face of the classical trichotomy 
of contained, containing, and uncontained—symbolically, of object (that which is 
contained), space (the container), and subject (uncontained or transcendent 
consciousness). So Figure 2—in schematically depicting the process by which an 
object, in the act of containing itself, is fluidly transformed into subject—can be said to 
constitute a simple blueprint for phenomenological interrelatedness. What we have 
here is a graphic indication of how the mutually exclusive categories of classical 
thought are surpassed by a threefold relation of mutual inclusion. 
One is reminded of the depth dimension described by Merleau-Ponty in “Eye and 
Mind” (1964). Using the painting of Cézanne as his primary example of depth, 
Merleau-Ponty intimates a visual space that is not abstracted from its content but 
constitutes an unbroken flow from container to content. In Cézannian space, “we must 
seek space and its content as together” (180). Moreover, the depth dimension engages 
embodied subjectivity: it “goes toward things from, as starting point, this body to 
which I myself am fastened” (173). Therefore, in realizing depth, we surpass the 
concept of space as but an inert container and come to understand it as an aspect of an 
indivisible cycle of action in which the “contained” and “uncontained”—object and 
subject—are integrally incorporated. 
What the Klein bottle does for its part is help sharpen the intuition of depth by 
lending topological detail and precision to it. Had I the space, I would develop this 
more fully (see Rosen 2004, 2006, 2008a, 2008b). For now, let me just suggest that this 
“firming up” of phenomenological insight into the nature of dimensional structure 
brings phenomenology a step closer to being able to serve effectively in a regrounding 
of modern physics. However, to close the gap between the “hard” and the “soft,” 
“hardening” phenomenological intuition is not enough. Physics must be “softened.” 
Functioning as intermediary, the Klein bottle can facilitate this as well. Again I will 
limit myself to a summary account. 
 
The core feature of quantum mechanics is a subatomic process known as the quantum of 
action. This term refers to an oddly nonlinear quantized spinning that occurs at the 
Planck length and is associated with the emission of radiant energy. Said spin is the 
source of the microphysical uncertainty (Hestenes 1983, 73), and its mathematical 
expression as Planck’s constant is found everywhere in the equations of quantum 
mechanics, since the constant is necessary for managing the uncertainty. In two earlier 
works, I was able to demonstrate that the quantum of action is embodied by the Klein 
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bottle, and that, in fact, the connection is already implicit in the standard formulation 
of subatomic spin, though the relationship is well disguised (Rosen 2008a, 2008b). 
The link with the Klein bottle is traced back through the work of Wolfgang Pauli. 
When Pauli sought to model quantum mechanical spin, he employed the mathematics 
of complex numbers (involving the imaginary i), and, in particular, the 
“hypernumbers” previously developed by William Clifford. The mathematician 
Charles Musès (1977) related microphysical spin to a particular hypernumber he called 
“epsilon”3, and I, for my part, have shown that the topo-phenomenological 
counterpart of epsilon is the Klein bottle. 
But mainstream theoretical physics does not recognize the “soft” Kleinian core of 
subatomic spin. Instead, physics stays “hard,” maintains its objectivity, by treating the 
quantum of action like a “black box.” We need not be concerned about the chaos the 
box contains—the uncertainty, the subject-object interpenetration, the “wild being” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1968, 211)—as long as it can be contained. This is done by 
incorporating the underlying Kleinian spin into the theory as a constant value in 
accounts that maintain in probabilistic approximation the old aims of objectifying and 
controlling nature. In this way, the intrinsic dynamism of the world is cordoned off, 
functioning as an isolated negativity within an otherwise purely “positive” treatment of 
nature. 
I noted earlier, however, that when it comes to the problem of unifying all four 
forces of nature through a theory of quantum gravity, physics does face the prospect of 
probing inside the Planck-scaled “box,” and thus encountering the sub-Planckian 
pandemonium so dreaded by objectivist ontology. A Pandora’s box would therefore be 
opened or—switching metaphors, the genie would be let out of the bottle. 
What I am proposing is that the crisis can effectively be addressed by recognizing 
the “bottle” to be Kleinian. Though physics can no longer “stay hard,” maintain its 
objectivist stance when confronted with quantum gravity (as the limitations of string 
theory attest), neither need it simply dissolve in chaos if it has the wherewithal to shift 
its philosophical ground to phenomenology. Understanding the sub-Planckian world 
as Kleinian rather than purely chaotic facilitates such a shift, thereby bringing about a 
fruitful “softening” of physics. By concretizing phenomenological relatedness through 
topological imagination and applying it to microphysics, uncertainty and subject-
object interaction can come to be fully and constructively accepted. In fact, this 
approach can advance the work of quantum gravity in specific ways. In particular, I 
have shown that the Klein bottle generalizes to a family of four topological structures 
aligned with the four forces of nature (see Rosen 2008a, 2008b). 
3 Epsilon is defined as ε2 = +1, but ε ≠ ± 1. 
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Summing up, this paper has sought to carry forward Merleau-Ponty’s insights into 
the crisis in modern physics. Following Merleau-Ponty, I have suggested that physics 
can address the dilemma it faces only by shifting its philosophical base from 
objectivism to phenomenology. To bridge the gap between “hard science” and “soft 
philosophy,” I have taken Merleau-Ponty’s cue about the promise of topology and 
expanded on it via the Klein bottle. The hope is that by “softening” physics and 
“hardening” phenomenology, the “two cultures” can be wed and a new kind of 
science be born. 
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